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REGULATING THE MILITIA WELL:
EVALUATING CHOICES FOR STATE AND
MUNICIPAL REGULATORS POST-HELLER
Benjamin H. Weissman*
Until its 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S.
Supreme Court had never struck down any firearm restrictions as violating
the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Heller, the majority
held that the Second Amendment’s text and original public meaning protect
an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home.
Both proponents and opponents of gun control regulation saw the Heller
decision as ushering in a new era of Second Amendment jurisprudence.
On the one hand, Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the majority in
Heller was seen as a vindication of an inherent natural right that had been
obscured for too long. On the other hand, many see the Heller decision as
having few consequences (besides at the margins) for “America’s already
weak gun control regime.” Until the Supreme Court offers more guidance
on how far the Second Amendment right extends outside the home for selfdefense, it is the lower courts that will ultimately decide how and to what
extent that right may be restricted by government regulation. According to
several commentators, in the years since Heller and McDonald v. City of
Chicago, lower courts have shied away from invalidating any current
restrictions besides total bans similar to the ones at issue in those decisions.
This Note will examine how the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and
McDonald have affected state and municipal attempts to regulate the
possession and use of firearms. In the wake of those decisions, lower courts
have developed several loose frameworks for evaluating challenges to
firearm restrictions. Given this confusing judicial landscape, scholars and
commentators offer competing views of what that landscape means for the
choices that state and local regulators can and should make. This Note will
ultimately evaluate these views in light of the developments and trends in
recent case law.

* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.S.F.S., 2009, Georgetown
University. The author wishes to thank Professor George W. Conk for his insight and
guidance throughout the writing process.
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“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” 1
“Our thoughts and prayers are with the students and families impacted by
yesterday’s terrible tragedy in Centennial, Colorado, and with every one
of the 90 families that lose loved ones in our nation every day to gun
violence. We will continue to fight for the solutions we know exist to
make this the safer nation we all want and deserve, on behalf of every

1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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victim and every American who knows that, when it comes to protecting
our children, we can do better than this.” 2
“Dec. 14 is the anniversary of the horrendous Newtown shooting, but
despite the best efforts of opportunistic politicians, Americans show little
sympathy for proposals to tighten restrictions on guns.” 3

INTRODUCTION
Since at least the eighteenth century, state and local governments have
placed restrictions on the possession and use of firearms. 4 Until its decision
in District of Columbia v. Heller5 in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court had
never struck down any of these restrictions as violating the Second
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.6 In fact, for most of the twentieth
century, courts had consistently held that the Second Amendment only
protected a right to keep and bear arms in connection with a state militia,7
and that the Second Amendment only circumscribed federal rather than
state conduct.8 In Heller, the majority held that the Second Amendment’s
text and original public meaning protect an individual’s right to keep and
bear arms for self-defense.9 Two years later, the Court held in McDonald v.
City of Chicago10 that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment right against the states,
so that states and local governments were also barred from infringing the
right to keep and bear arms.11 Both proponents and opponents of gun
control regulation saw the Heller decision as ushering in a new era of
Second Amendment jurisprudence.12

2. Dan Gross, Brady Campaign Statement on One Year After Newtown, Colorado
School Shooting, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Dec. 14, 2013),
http://www.bradycampaign.org/?q=brady-campaign-statement-on-one-year-after-newtowncolorado-school-shooting.
3. Americans Simply Not Interested in Gun Control, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR
LEGIS. ACTION (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/in-the-news/2013/
12/americans-simply-not-interested-in-gun-control.aspx.
4. See infra Part I.C.
5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
6. See Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1412–13 (2009).
7. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 708 (2012).
8. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. Most courts had held that the Second
Amendment was not incorporated against the states through either the Privileges and
Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
9. See 554 U.S. at 628–29.
10. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
11. See id. at 3050. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Compare Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27,
2008), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books/defense-looseness (“[Heller] was the most
noteworthy of the Court’s recent term. It is questionable in both method and result, and it is
evidence that the Supreme Court, in deciding constitutional cases, exercises a freewheeling
discretion strongly flavored with ideology.”), with Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The
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On one hand, Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Heller
was seen as a vindication of an inherent natural right that had been obscured
for too long.13 Before the decision, only the Fifth Circuit had held that the
Second Amendment guaranteed an individual the right to keep and bear
arms unconnected to militia service.14 Most other courts agreed that the
Second Amendment guaranteed only a so-called “collective” right to keep
and bear arms in connection with militia service.15 Thus, the Heller
decision can be seen as the culmination of decades of scholarly and political
persuasion to revise courts’ notions of the contours of the Second
Amendment.16
On the other hand, many see the Heller decision as having few
consequences (besides at the margins) for “America’s already weak gun
control regime.”17 Until the Supreme Court offers more guidance on how
far the Second Amendment right extends outside the home for self-defense,
the lower courts will ultimately decide how and to what extent that right
may be restricted by government regulation.18 According to several
commentators, in the years since Heller and McDonald, lower courts have
shied away from invalidating any current restrictions besides total bans
similar to the ones at issue in those decisions.19
While lower courts and academics debate the scope of this constitutional
right, the problem of gun violence remains.20 There is a wealth of scholarly
Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (applauding the Heller
decision as “historic in its implications and exemplary in its reasoning”).
13. See David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the
World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 235–36 (2008) (applauding the Heller decision for
affirming that the Second Amendment merely “codified a pre-existing right” to keep and
bear arms for self-defense).
14. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035, 2037 (2008) (citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th
Cir. 2001)).
15. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Second
Amendment affords only a collective right to own or possess guns or other firearms . . . .”),
abrogated by Heller, 554 U.S. 570; Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710–11
(7th Cir. 1999) (same), abrogated by Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
16. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 708 (describing how courts began to “take notice” of
the “large outpouring of scholarly literature”).
17. Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich, The Scholarly Landscape Since Heller, in THE
SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
383, 389 (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013) (citing Adam Winkler, The
Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v. Heller: Heller’s Catch-22, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2009)).
18. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 706 (“It is in the application of [Heller and McDonald]
that ‘the Second Amendment rubber meets the road’ and the actual impact of these
constitutional issues on Americans’ lives will be determined.” (quoting United States v.
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring)).
19. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 706–07 (“The lower courts, frustrated by the
indeterminacy of historical inquiry and puzzled by the categorizations suggested by Justice
Scalia, have . . . effectively embraced the sort of interest-balancing approach . . . in a way
that is highly deferential to legislative determinations and that leads to all but the most
drastic restrictions on guns being upheld.”).
20. See generally About Gun Violence, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http://www.bradycampaign.org/?q=about-gun-violence (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (“On
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analysis on how courts should proceed with challenges brought under the
newly incorporated Second Amendment.21 There is, however, much less of
a focus on the opportunities and challenges that this new jurisprudence has
wrought for state and local regulators seeking to combat gun violence in
their jurisdictions.22
This Note will examine how the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and
McDonald have affected state and municipal attempts to regulate the
possession and use of firearms. In the wake of those decisions, lower courts
have developed several loose frameworks for evaluating challenges to
firearm restrictions.23 Given this confusing judicial landscape, scholars and
commentators offer competing views of what that landscape means for the
choices that state and local regulators can and should make. This Note
evaluates these views in light of how case law has developed recently.
This Note begins by examining the Second Amendment’s history and the
recent Supreme Court decisions. Part I describes generally the history of
the Second Amendment and its adoption as part of the Bill of Rights. This
Part next examines Second Amendment jurisprudence and different
interpretations of the scope and content of the protections it affords
individual citizens. It then provides an overview of the decisions in District
of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago. Part I concludes
by presenting a framework based primarily on the work of Eugene Volokh
for analyzing and categorizing different regulatory choices for restricting
possession and ownership of firearms.
Part II provides an overview of how lower courts have evaluated
challenges to firearm restrictions in the wake of Heller and McDonald.
Next it identifies and explains competing characterizations of this
landscape. In particular, Part II focuses on Allen Rostron’s argument that
courts are engaging in interest balancing that effectively defers to the
government and, Nicholas Johnson’s argument that the “common use”
standard from Heller is particularly vulnerable to manipulation by courts to
uphold questionable restrictions.
Part III evaluates the competing accounts against recent case law. This
Part identifies where each of the accounts has proven most accurate. Part
III ultimately concludes that while Johnson’s “common use” standard is

average, 32 Americans are murdered with guns every day . . . 140 are treated for a gun
assault in an emergency room . . . 51 people kill themselves with a firearm, and 45 people
are shot or killed in an accident with a gun.”).
21. See generally Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 17 (surveying the academic
landscape since Heller and McDonald).
22. See, e.g., Louis M. Wasserman, Gun Control on College and University Campuses
in the Wake of District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 19 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2011) (discussing how public colleges and universities can navigate the
post-Heller landscape to best fashion constitutional gun control policies on their campuses);
see also Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control After District of
Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 383, 412–17 (2009) (arguing that Heller, by
removing the option of total bans from gun regulators’ arsenal of policy choices, may
actually make it easier to pass gun control laws that fall short of a total ban).
23. See infra Part II.
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being applied by simple restrictions against clearly dangerous and unusual
weapons, courts engage in interest balancing once the challenge is less
easily decided.
I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT: HISTORY UP THROUGH HELLER
This Part begins by providing a brief history of the adoption of the
Second Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights during the first Congress.
This Part then briefly describes the main competing views of the protections
afforded to individuals by the Second Amendment. Next, this Part
discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in District of Columbia v.
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, which provided an answer to the
question of whether the Second Amendment confers an individual right to
firearms. This Part concludes by providing a framework for analysis of
regulatory choices that focuses both on the type of restriction and the legal
justification for the government’s authority to effect that restriction.
A. The Second Amendment: History and Interpretation
This section attempts to provide a brief history of the enactment of the
Second Amendment. Because the majority opinion in Heller placed so
much emphasis on a historical inquiry into the purpose and understanding
of the Second Amendment at the time of its enactment,24 this section
provides a basic background narrative. It is important to note, however,
that the history of the right to keep and bear arms in the United States is far
from settled.
First, many disagree as to the utility of the search for a clear and
comprehensive narrative of how the Second Amendment was understood at
the time of its adoption. Some, like Justice Scalia, find clear answers from
certain texts and historical sources.25 Yet others struggle with the value and
implications of the various conflicting historical accounts.26
Second, assuming there is one overarching story to be found in the
Amendment’s history, the content of that story has been hotly debated for

24. See infra Part I.B.
25. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584–85 (2008) (finding that
“[i]t is clear . . . that ‘bear arms’ did not refer only to carrying a weapon in an organized
military unit,” based on, inter alia, “[n]ine state constitutional provisions written in the 18th
century or the first two decades of the 19th, which enshrined a right of citizens to ‘bear arms
in defense of themselves and the state’ or ‘bear arms in defense of himself and the state’”);
BRIAN DOHERTY, GUN CONTROL ON TRIAL: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT BATTLE OVER THE
SECOND AMENDMENT 2 (2008) (“If Madison, a leading Federalist, openly explained that one
of the reasons Anti-Federalists had little reason to fear the new government created by the
Constitution was Americans’ unaltered right to possess guns, it’s hard to see how anyone
could deny that that liberty was an understood natural possession of Americans among the
people who wrote and ratified the Second Amendment.”).
26. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012) (acknowledging that
while the Court’s historical analysis in Heller is binding, conclusions from historical
evidence about the scope of the right are at least “debatable”); Rostron, supra note 7, at 732
(discussing the history of excluding convicted felons from the right to keep and bear arms
and finding that “[t]he historical evidence simply is too easy to spin in either direction”).
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several decades.27 Some find that the political and legal history of the
Amendment’s enactment clearly indicate that it protected only the states’
right to maintain and arm their militias.28
Others find that the
Amendment’s history clearly points in the opposite direction, asserting that
the Bill of Rights and its Second Amendment guaranteed individual private
citizens protection from being disarmed by the federal government.29
These competing accounts shape how the Second Amendment is now
understood in courts and in legislatures and, notwithstanding their disparate
implications, are essential for understanding the scope of authority of state
and local governments to regulate that right.
1. Constitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights
Concerns about external and internal threats to the new republic
dominated the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.30 Many political
leaders feared that unrest would lead different groups to rebel, causing the
United States to descend into anarchy.31 Delegates also perceived external
threats from Native American attacks, British troops on the frontier, and
Spanish troops along the Mississippi River.32 These threats to the fledgling
nation placed the questions of control over the state militias and creation of
a standing army at the forefront of the constitutional debate.33
Many delegates embraced the new nationalist ideal of a strong and
centralized standing army as the primary national defense.34 Rather than
relying solely on the well-regulated state militias that had struggled against
the British army in the U.S. Revolutionary War, these delegates advocated
for some combination of a standing national army, increased federal control
over state militias, or the creation of an “elite” militia drawn from the state
militias.35
27. See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A
Primer, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 1, 1–2 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000)
(pointing out that the first scholarly article to champion the “individual rights” position did
not appear until 1960).
28. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in
Historical Perspective, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY, supra note 27, at
117, 146 (“The Amendment was not a suicide clause allowing revolutionaries to create
private militias with which to otherthrow [sic] the national government or even to impede the
faithful execution of the law; it prevented Congress from abolishing the organized, wellregulated militias of the states.”).
29. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 57 (2013) (“In 1791, the American federal Bill of Rights was
ratified, in part, as a formal recognition that private individuals would never be disarmed.”).
30. See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 39–41 (2006).
31. See id. at 39. Shays’ Rebellion, led by “debt-ridden farmers,” was fresh in the minds
of many delegates, as was the perceived threat to order from slaves in the South. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 40.
34. See id.
35. See id.; see also id. at 48 (discussing the Federalist argument during ratification that
“it was unwise to put too great a reliance on the militia, a misplaced faith that nearly ‘lost us
our independence’”).
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A minority of delegates, however, feared the implications of this
nationalist agenda.36 These Anti-Federalists argued that state control over
the militias was essential for keeping the national government from
growing too strong.37 The creation of a national standing army would
necessarily threaten the states’ ability to protect their citizens’ individual
liberties.38
Though dominated by Federalists pushing for stronger national control,
the convention ultimately compromised and gave the federal government
the authority to organize, arm, discipline, and “call forth the aid” of the
militia, while reserving for the states control over the training and
leadership of their militias.39 Some delegates, including Virginia’s George
Mason, advocated adding a declaration of rights to the framework of the
Constitution.40 This declaration was rejected, at least in part because a
majority of delegates felt that a national government of limited, enumerated
powers made it redundant and unnecessary to protect rights that the national
government of limited powers could not infringe in the first place.41
The convention sent its proposed Constitution to the Continental
Congress, who approved it without amendment and sent it to the states for
ratification.42 Opposition to ratification centered mainly around the failure
to include a bill of enumerated rights and the lack of a ban on creation of a
national standing army.43 The Federalist response to these criticisms was
simple: “The people and the states retained all powers not delegated to the
new government” including any to be included in a bill of rights, and a
standing army was necessary for national defense and would be controlled
by a fully representative government.44 The Anti-Federalists tied the
importance of the militias to concerns about federalism: without sufficient
control over their militias, states would be subject to the control of an

36. See id. at 40.
37. See id. (“Opponents of the nationalist agenda feared that if state authority over the
militia were undermined and the federal government were given the ability to raise a
standing army, there would be no way to check the designs of ambitious and corrupt
rulers.”).
38. See id. (“If history had taught any lesson to these Americans, it was that if power
was unchecked, it inevitably led to despotism.”).
39. See id. at 43. “In so doing, the convention made the militia a creature of both the
states and the new national government.” Id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 43–44. Cornell also suggests that because the Constitution could always
be amended in the future, the addition of a declaration of rights was not seen as crucial at
this stage. See id. at 44 (“Others may have been too worn out to take up the issue and were
confident the document could easily be amended at a future date if necessary.”). Finkelman,
however, argues that the rights to be protected in Mason’s proposal were rejected by the
Federalist majority as attempts to limit the national government described in the original
document rather than simply declaring protected individual liberties. See Finkelman, supra
note 28, at 143–44.
42. See CORNELL, supra note 30, at 44.
43. See id. at 45.
44. Id.
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oppressive national government.45 The persistence and popularity of AntiFederalist concerns forced Federalists to refine their conception of the role
of the militias in the United States, eventually conceding the importance of
the militia as the “bulwark against tyranny.”46
After ratification of the new Constitution in 1789, the Anti-Federalists
began to push instead for amendments to the Constitution as a way of
limiting the power of the new federal government.47 The Bill of Rights that
James Madison eventually proposed to the first Congress, however,
included none of the structural changes that the Anti-Federalists hoped
would restrict the federal government’s newly ratified power.48 Madison’s
proposed amendments concerned those individual rights and civil liberties
most commonly associated with a modern understanding of the Bill of
Rights.49
The Second Amendment, along with the other first ten amendments,
arose out of this conflict between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists
over the nature of the nascent federal government.50 Where before, the
right to keep and bear arms was tied to the exercise of militia service, the
Constitutional Convention placed the right squarely in the center of a larger
debate about federalism and state rights.51
In crafting the Constitution, the Framers divided the responsibility for
military protection among the president, Congress, and state governments.52
The provisions in Article I and Article II provided for two layers of military
protection, a national army governed and executed by Congress and the
president, and state militias organized under state law but ultimately subject

45. See id. at 46 (“Without their militias to protect them, the states would be at the
mercy of a strong government, which would soon consolidate all power within its orbit.”).
46. Id. at 47.
47. See CORNELL, supra note 30, at 51 (“Still seething over their defeat, the AntiFederalist minority resolved to take their appeal directly to the people.”); Finkelman, supra
note 28, at 120. But see HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 82 (describing the Bill of Rights as an
“acknowledgement of the conditions under which the state conventions ratified the
Constitution, and in response to popular demand for a written declaration of individual
freedoms”).
48. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 121. Finkelman points out that
[t]he fact that the majority of anti-Federalist proposals were structural, rather than
libertarian, underscores the fact that the most prominent anti-Federalists were only
marginally interested in a bill of rights. . . . Once the Constitution was ratified, . . .
they were no longer interested in a bill of rights and instead wanted a wholesale
restructuring of the Constitution.
Id. at 123. But see HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 70 (“[T]he Federalist[s argued] that a Bill
of Rights was unnecessary because the proposed government had no positive grant of power
to deprive individuals of rights, and the anti-Federalist[s] conten[ded] that a formal
declaration would enhance protection of those rights.”).
49. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 121–22.
50. See id. at 124–25.
51. See CORNELL, supra note 30, at 41 (“The debate over the federal constitution would
change [the model of the right to bear arms] as the arguments over [its] meaning . . . became
embroiled in the larger dispute over federalism.”).
52. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 124.
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to regulation by Congress and the president.53 The Anti-Federalists were
most concerned about the potential for a standing national army to threaten
the people’s liberty.54 The Federalist-dominated convention ultimately
rejected Anti-Federalist proposals that would have weakened federal
authority over military protection.55 The Anti-Federalists instead published
their Reasons of Dissent that contained fourteen proposed amendments to
the newly ratified Constitution.56 The seventh proposed amendment would
have protected an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense
and hunting and not to be disarmed unless dangerous to others or convicted
of a crime, and would have prevented Congress from maintaining a
standing army during peace time.57 The eighth proposed amendment would
have protected an individual’s right to hunt and fish on his property and all
other unenclosed lands.58 The eleventh proposed amendment provided that
states would retain the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia and that Congress could only call to action state militias with the
state’s consent.59

53. See id. (“[T]he defense of the United States would rely on both the state militias and
the standing army.”).
54. See id. at 125 (“According to the traditional Whig and Republican ideology of the
period, a ‘standing army’ threatened the liberties of a free people. This argument was rooted
in English history, where the army was traditionally a remote mercenary force, disconnected
from the people, and under the direct control of a hereditary monarch.”).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 126. Finkelman argues that because many of these proposed amendments
were eventually adopted almost verbatim, the changes that Madison and the Federalists
made to the right to keep and bear arms are significant. See id. (“It is of utmost significance,
. . . that unlike other aspects of the Pennsylvania proposals that had been incorporated into
the Bill of Rights, on [the issues of the army, the militia, the right to bear arms, and the right
to hunt,] Madison and his colleagues in the First Congress emphatically rejected the goals
and the language of the Pennsylvania anti-Federalists.”).
57. See id. The seventh proposed amendment read:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and
their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law
shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies
in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that
the military shall be kept under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil
powers.
Id.
58. See id. at 127. The eighth proposed amendment read:
The inhabitants of the several states shall have liberty to fowl and hunt in
seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on all other lands in the United States
not enclosed, and in like manner to fish in all navigable waters, and others not
private property, without being restrained therein by the laws to be passed by the
legislature of the United States.
Id.
59. See id. The eleventh proposed amendment read, in two separate paragraphs:
That the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia (the manner
of disciplining the militia to be prescribed by Congress) remain with the individual
states, and that Congress shall not have authority to call or march any of the militia
out of their own state, without the consent of such state, and for such length of
time only as such state shall agree.
....
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Taken together, these proposed amendments would have significantly
weakened the federal government’s ability to respond to rebellion and
invasion.60 On the other hand, the Anti-Federalists believed that the
creation of a standing army without these protections would allow the
federal government to disarm the state militias, which would significantly
endanger individual liberty.61
The Bill of Rights that Madison ultimately proposed to Congress
preserved the structure and power of the federal government as
contemplated by the Constitution.62 The rights enumerated and protected in
the Bill of Rights, then, can be seen as “clarifying the meaning of the
Constitution and not fundamentally changing its nature.”63 Especially
given Shays’ Rebellion and the fear of other armed insurrections, Madison
and the Federalists who dominated Congress would have been loathe to
diminish the power of the federal government by adopting such a broad
right to keep and bear arms as proposed by the Anti-Federalists.64 The
Anti-Federalists, for their part, feared that the federal government would
nationalize the state militias to infringe upon individual liberties or that the
federal government would disband them altogether.65
The debates in Congress over the Second Amendment began with
Madison’s first proposed text:
A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the
best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be
compelled to bear arms.66

That the sovereignty, freedom, and independency of the several states shall be
retained, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this constitution
expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.
Id. Finkelman argues that reading these two paragraphs together “underscores the
connection many anti-Federalists saw between state sovereignty and the control of the state
militia.” Id.
60. See id. Finkelman notes that
one of the primary reasons for calling the Constitutional Convention was the fear
that without a stronger central government the new nation would be unstable,
militarily weak, and might not survive . . . . The kind of amendments the
Pennsylvania minority wanted would have undermined these powers and the new
government itself.
Id.
61. See HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 74.
62. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 130.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 131 (“[I]t would have been out of character for the [First] Congress,
dominated as it was by supporters of the new Constitution, to cripple the new government’s
ability to control dangerous, musket-toting elements of the population like Daniel Shays.”).
But see HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 80 (arguing that the Second Amendment was adopted
to allay fears about federal control over a standing army and the militias, by guaranteeing
“the revolutionary ideal” that every man be armed with a gun).
65. See Finkelman, supra note 28, at 137–39.
66. Id. at 139.
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Debates in the House of Representatives focused mainly on the last clause
that provided a religious exemption from militia service.67 Nevertheless,
the House passed an amendment very close to Madison’s original proposal,
adding only the words “in person” at the end of the last clause.68 The
Senate, however, rejected many proposed amendments that resembled the
proposed amendments to the Constitution in the Reasons for Dissent that
would prevent Congress from maintaining a standing army and significantly
weaken the federal government’s control over state militias.69 Before
adopting the final text as it would be included in the final Bill of Rights, the
Senate removed the clauses that provided for a religious exemption from
militia service and the definition of the militia as the “body of the
people.”70
2. Individual Right Theory Versus Collective Right Theory
This section provides a brief overview of the competing theories about
the kind of right guaranteed by the Second Amendment: the “individual
right” theory as opposed to the “collective right” theory. The different
theories’ names are somewhat misleading; as Justice John Paul Stevens
explains, though the Second Amendment clearly guarantees some sort of

67. See id. at 139; see also HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 84–86 (discussing
congressional debate over the religious exemption clause of the proposed amendment).
Finkelman notes, however, that the Senate kept no written records of its debates and the
House did not spend much time debating this amendment at all. See Finkelman, supra note
28, at 139.
68. See HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 86.
69. See id. at 88. Halbrook notes that “attempts to strengthen recognition of state rights
over militias and to proscribe standing armies would fail.” See id. Halbrook also observes,
“Amendments mandating avoidance of standing armies were rejected.” See id. As was a
proposal “[t]hat each state respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to
provide for the same.” JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 126 (New York, Thomas Greenleaf, 1789); see also HALBROOK, supra note 29,
at 88.
70. See HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 88 (explaining that some clauses were removed to
eliminate redundancy, while the religious exemption might have been left out “to preclude
any constitutional authority of the government to ‘compel’ individuals (even those without
religious scruples) to bear arms for any purpose”); see also JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION
OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 69, at 104 (recording the fifth
proposed Amendment presented to the House on August 24, 1789, to read, “A well regulated
militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, but no one religiously scrupulous
of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person”). Halbrook argues
The Senate’s deletion of the well-recognized definition of ‘militia’ as ‘the body of
the people’ implied nothing more than its wish to be concise. But its rejection of
the proposal to limit the amendment’s recognition of the right to bear arms ‘for the
common defence’ meant to preclude any limitation on the individual right to have
arms, for example, for self-defense or hunting.
HALBROOK, supra note 29, at 88–89 (citations omitted).
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right that can be enforced by individuals, it is the scope of that right that is
controversial.71
According to the individual rights theory, the prefatory clause,72 or
preamble, means that (1) a militia would better protect individual liberties
than a standing army and (2) the people had a right to keep and bear arms
for many purposes, including participation in such a militia.73 This
perspective argues that the militia was seen by the Founders as “the
ultimate democratic check on foreign policy, ensuring that only defensive
wars will be fought.”74
The First and Fourth Amendments similarly refer to “the people,” and
those amendments have long been thought to confer individual rights.75
Patrick Charles concedes “it would be a textual farce to interpret ‘people’
having one meaning in the First and Fourth Amendments and another in the
Second Amendment.”76 If the Amendment were read only to confer the
right to participate in a well-regulated militia, then Article I, Section 8
would effectively place the control of militias in the hands of the federal
government, exactly what the militias were meant to protect against.77 The
collective rights theorist would reply that the Second Amendment was
meant to counter Congress’ Article I, Section 8 power.78 Thus, under the
collective rights theory, the right is better understood as restricting the
power of Congress by providing for a well-regulated militia of the people.79
The collective rights theorist would add that the Second Amendment was
meant to be a restriction on Congress rather than on the states and their
militias, evidenced by its placement in the Bill of Rights next to the First
Amendment.80
71. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). But see Bogus, supra note 27, at 5 (describing how early court cases held that
individuals were not able to enforce the Second Amendment right).
72. The text of the Second Amendment is usually separated into two clauses: the
prefatory and the operative clause. See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE
INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 5 (2009).
73. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 9.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. CHARLES, supra note 72, at 17.
77. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 10. Article I, Section 8 provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power . . . . To provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed
in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
78. See CHARLES, supra note 72, at 23–24 & n.50.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 15–16 (explaining that because “the First Amendment reads ‘Congress
shall make no law . . . ,’ the [Second Amendment] was initially intended to be a restriction
on Congress, not an individual right” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (emphasis added)).
The First and Second Amendments were originally the Third and Fourth Articles, and the
First and Second Articles also placed limits on Congress. See id. at 16. “Thus, both
individual right and collective right theorists have a legitimate argument that the
amendment’s placement in the Bill of Rights supports their stance.” Id. at 17.
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Discussing the interpretation of “bear arms,” Charles points out that
eighteenth century colonial laws used the word “carry” to refer to civilian
possession of arms, while “bear arms” referred to possession as part of
military service, which “reinforce[s] an intended distinction between the
words ‘bear’ and ‘carry.’”81 Further, reading the phrase “bear arms” in
conjunction with the prefatory clause’s reference to a “well regulated
militia” makes clear for the collective rights theorists that the phrase
referred to military service. This is especially so given that the Constitution
was drafted by “America’s best legal and legislative minds,” meaning that
the choice of “bear” and not “carry” is meaningful.82 Charles also argues
that in the militia context, to “keep” is better understood to mean maintain
rather than to own or possess.83
Proponents of the individual rights theory point to nineteenth-century
state court decisions and state legislative actions, in which the individual
rights interpretation dominates.84 These decisions, the individual rights
theorist would argue, conclusively show how the common understanding of
the Second Amendment protected an individual’s right to keep and bear
arms.85
Before Heller, the Supreme Court had not reached a Second Amendment
issue since its 1939 ruling in United States v. Miller.86 There, the Court
asked whether the weapon at issue “has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” and concluded that
because it did not, its regulation was not protected by the Second
Amendment.87 The Court would not reach another Second Amendment
challenge until 2008, nearly seventy years later.
B. The Decisions in Heller and McDonald
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held the District of
Columbia’s prohibition on handgun possession to be an unconstitutional
infringement on an individual’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms.88 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the Amendment’s
text and subsequent treatment by courts and legislatures confirmed that it

81. See id. at 17–30.
82. See id. at 23.
83. See id. at 28.
84. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 11–13 (citing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2
Litt.) 90, 91–92 (1822) (“[W]hatever restrains . . . the full and complete exercise of [the right
to bear arms in defense of the citizens and the state], though not an entire destruction of it, is
forbidden by the explicit language of the [Kentucky] constitution.”)).
85. See id.
86. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). But see David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-Five
Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 99 (1999) (examining Supreme Court decisions between Miller
and Heller and concluding that the Court has indeed considered the right to keep and bear
arms and found it to be an individual one).
87. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. But see Kopel, supra note 86 (arguing that Miller has been
misunderstood and misapplied since it was decided).
88. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008).
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protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms.89 In so holding, Justice
Scalia rejected the “collective right” notion that the Second Amendment
only protected the right to keep and bear arms as part of militia service.90
The Court held that the Amendment’s prefatory clause merely “announces
the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the
militia.”91 The prefatory clause does not, however, limit the scope of the
right by “suggest[ing] that preserving the militia was the only reason
Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more
important for self-defense and hunting.”92 In this way, Justice Scalia’s
interpretation of the operative clause to “guarantee the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation”93 is confirmed and
supported by the prefatory clause.94
The District of Columbia’s firearm code had several provisions at issue.
First, it effectively banned handgun possession anywhere in the District of
Columbia.95 Second, the code required individuals to keep other lawfully
owned firearms “‘unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or
similar device’” while in the home.96 Finally, the code prohibited carrying
a handgun without a permit issued by the chief of police.97
Ultimately, the Court held that the District of Columbia’s total ban on
handgun possession was invalid because it prevented an individual from
using “the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in
the home,”98 a place “where the need for defense of self, family, and
property is most acute.”99 Likewise, the Court held unconstitutional the
code’s requirement that other guns be kept dissembled and unloaded in the
home, because it “makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core
lawful purpose of self-defense.”100 Despite the District of Columbia’s
argument that that requirement implicitly excepted use for self-defense, the
Court found the statute’s language to preclude such an interpretation.101
The Court did not reach analysis of the licensing requirement, as respondent
Heller would presumably be eligible to license his handgun if the ban was
struck down.102

89. See id. at 595.
90. See id. at 577–81.
91. Id. at 599.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 592.
94. See id. at 598.
95. Id. at 574–75 (characterizing the District of Columbia’s law as “generally
prohibit[ing] the possession of handguns”); see also D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 72502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001).
96. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 575 (quoting D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02).
97. See D.C. CODE §§ 22-4504(a), -4506.
98. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
99. Id. at 628.
100. Id. at 630.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 630–31.
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The Court made clear that the right to keep and bear arms is neither
unlimited nor unqualified.103 Justice Scalia noted the continuing validity of
many restrictions and prohibitions on the possession of firearms. 104 In
listing certain types of “longstanding prohibitions,” Justice Scalia made
clear that the Court was only providing examples of lawful regulatory
measures rather than a comprehensive list.105 The Court interpreted its
1939 holding in United States v. Miller to be consistent with its Heller
holding, insofar as the Miller decision upheld a lawful limitation on the
right to keep and bear arms not “in common use at the time.”106 Justice
Scalia found that limitation to be “fairly supported by the historical tradition
of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.”107
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second
Amendment’s protections against action by states and municipalities.108
Relying in large part on its exploration of the history of the right to keep
and bear arms in Heller two years earlier, the Court found that the right was
so fundamental as to warrant incorporation by the Due Process Clause.109
Until the Court’s decision in McDonald, the majority of lower courts had
held the Second Amendment’s protections inapplicable to the states.110
103. See id. at 626–27.
104. See id. (“[N]othing in [the Court’s] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”).
105. See id. at 627 & n.26.
106. See id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). For a
critique of the potential application of the “common use standard” by post-Heller courts, see
Nicholas J. Johnson, Administering the Second Amendment: Law, Politics, and Taxonomy,
50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1263 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, Administering] and Nicholas J.
Johnson, The Second Amendment in the States and the Limits of the Common Use Standard,
(Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 1722955, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722955 [hereinafter Johnson, Common
Use].
107. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DOHERTY, supra
note 25, at 109 (“The Miller precedent was about the type of weapon, not the people to
whom the right accrued.”).
108. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
109. See id. at 3042 (“[I]t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights
necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”).
110. See, e.g., Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Second
Amendment’s ‘right to keep and bear arms’ imposes a limitation on only federal, not state,
legislative efforts.”), abrogated by McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020; Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 252 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he law is settled in our circuit that the
Second Amendment does not apply to the States.”), abrogated by McDonald, 130 S. Ct.
3020; Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 731 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“Until such time as Cruikshank and Presser are overturned, the Second Amendment limits
only federal action, and . . . stays the hand of the National Government only.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)), abrogated by McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020. But see Nordyke v.
King, 563 F.3d 439, 448, 457 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that although Fresno Rifle held that
the Second Amendment was not incorporated to the states through the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Second Amendment and applies it against the states and local governments”).
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These lower courts relied in part on the precedents of Presser v. Illinois111
and United States v. Cruikshank,112 which held that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the
Second Amendment to the states or municipalities.113 Thus, lower courts
did not often have occasion to analyze the scope of Second Amendment
protections as applied to state and municipal gun regulations.114
C. Limiting the Right To Keep and Bear Arms
In noting that Heller should not be read to invalidate certain
“longstanding prohibitions,”115 Justice Scalia acknowledged the substantial
history of state and municipal gun regulations since the eighteenth century.
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller discusses nineteenth century state court
cases describing the individual right conferred by the Second Amendment,
but in the context of restrictions placed on the exercise of that right or the
people to whom the right extends.116 This section examines characteristics
of firearm restrictions today and provides a framework for categorizing and
analyzing those restrictions.
1. Categories of Regulatory Choices
To better understand courts’ distinct challenges and treatment of different
kinds of regulatory choices, it is helpful to separate these choices into
categories to compare lower court decisions across similar regulatory
choices. It is important to remember, however, that these categories often
overlap. Similarly, courts are not often transparent or explicit in their
characterization of the challenged restriction or how that characterization
ultimately influences the court’s analysis. Nonetheless, it is valuable to

111. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
112. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
113. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 14–15.
114. See, e.g., Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Since we
hold that the second amendment does not apply to the states, we need not consider the scope
of its guarantee of the right to bear arms. For the sake of completeness, however, . . . we
briefly comment on what we believe to be the scope of the second amendment.”), abrogated
by McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020. Lower courts did, however, have occasion to examine the
scope of Second Amendment protections when deciding whether federal gun regulations
infringed that right. See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“[The Second Amendment] protects the right of individuals, including those not then
actually a member of any militia or engaged in active military service or training, to
privately possess and bear their own firearms . . . that are suitable as personal, individual
weapons and are not of the general kind or type excluded by Miller.”).
115. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
116. See id. at 611–14 (citing Waters v. State, 1 Gill 302, 309 (Md. 1843) (discussing free
blacks as a “dangerous population” who cannot lawfully bear arms); Aymette v. State, 21
Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840) (holding that the Tennessee state constitutional right to bear arms
did not preclude a ban on concealed weapons); United States v. Sheldon, 5 Blume Sup. Ct.
Trans. 337, 346 (Mich. 1829) (discussing the right to keep and bear arms as not “granted by
the constitution for an unlawful or unjustifiable purpose”); Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4
Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449 (1824) (holding that certain constitutional rights, including the
right to bear arms, did not extend to free blacks).
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separate different restrictions because their interactions with the Second
Amendment’s core protections should lead to different analyses.
Restrictions can be placed in the following general categories:
(1) prohibitions based on an individual’s characteristics;117 (2) prohibitions
of specific devices; (3) “time, place, and manner”118 restrictions on
possession; and (4) “frictional” regulations that add time, cost, or difficulty
to the process of obtaining and keeping a firearm. 119 Lower courts treat
regulations in different categories differently, depending in part on the
extent to which the “core” of the Second Amendment protections is
burdened.120 Whether the Second Amendment’s protections extend outside
the home or to purposes beyond self-defense is an open question for most
courts,121 as is the question of the extent to which those protections
diminish as they move further from the “core” protections discussed in
Heller.
a. “Who” Restrictions
Governments often restrict who is allowed to purchase, register, and
possess a firearm. The Heller decision noted the examples of prohibitions
on possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, cautioning that
these restrictions should still be “presumptively lawful.”122 Through
membership in a certain group or by exhibiting a certain characteristic, an
individual can be seen either as forfeiting the right or never accruing the
right in the first place.
Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit upheld a federal law making it a
crime for individuals convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors to carry

117. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639–45 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(explaining that “some categorical limits are proper,” and upholding a federal statute
prohibiting those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from carrying firearms).
118. Jeff Golimowski, Note, Pulling the Trigger: Evaluating Criminal Gun Laws in a
Post-Heller World, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599, 1616–18 (2012).
119. See Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1273.
120. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A]ny law
that would burden the ‘fundamental,’ core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding
citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move outside the home, firearm rights
have always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual
interests in self-defense.”). But see Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“A blanket prohibition on carrying gun[s] in public prevents a person from defending
himself anywhere except inside his home; and so substantial a curtailment of the right of
armed self-defense requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public
might benefit on balance from such a curtailment . . . .”).
121. See Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (“What we
know from [Heller and McDonald] is that the Second Amendment guarantees are at their
zenith within the home. What we do not know is the scope of that right beyond the home and
the standards for determining when and how the right can be regulated by a government.”
(citation omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). But see Moore, 702 F.3d at 942
(“The Supreme Court has decided that the [Second A]mendment confers a right to bear arms
for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.”).
122. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
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arms.123 In doing so, the court discussed “categorical limits on the
possession of firearms” and interpreted Heller to support some such limits
generally, especially in the context of “persons who have been shown to be
untrustworthy with weapons.”124 Another common example of “who”
restrictions are state licensing schemes that exclude nonresidents from the
licensing process.125
b. Device Restrictions
Device restrictions seek to prohibit the possession or ownership of
certain firearms, ammunition, or parts of firearms based on different
characteristics.126 This category is exemplified by assault weapons bans in
many states that outlaw certain types of firearms based on shared
characteristics.127 One common criticism of device bans is that they tend to
prohibit firearms with certain characteristics unrelated to their actual or
potential dangerousness.128
c. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Time, place, and manner restrictions place limits on the possession or use
of firearms in certain locations and during certain situations. This category
is drawn from the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence129 and is often

123. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to . . . possess any firearm or
ammunition.”).
124. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641. The Skoien court went on to say that “Heller did not
suggest that disqualifications would be effective only if the statute’s benefits are first
established by admissible evidence.” Id. Instead, categorical limits on certain classes of
people could be upheld under Heller as substantially related to the government’s objective in
preventing public harm. See id. at 641–42.
125. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-203(1)(a) (2013) (stating that permits for
concealed carry of handguns are only available for legal Colorado residents); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 400.00(3)(a) (McKinney 2014) (excluding nonresidents without in-state employment
from application process).
126. See generally Johnson, Common Use, supra note 106, at 5 (discussing problems with
applying Heller’s “common use” standard to “functionally common” subcategories of
firearm characteristics of ballistics, ammunition feeding, dimensions, and ammunition type).
127. See, e.g., People v. Zondorak, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 493 (Ct. App. 2013) (rejecting
a challenge to California’s Assault Weapons Control Act, codified at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 30605 (2011)).
128. See Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1266–67.
129. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make
clear . . . that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
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referred to explicitly by lower courts when deciding Second Amendment
challenges.130
In Doe v. Wilmington Housing Authority, the district court upheld a
challenge to a restriction on possession of firearms in common areas of
certain public housing complexes.131 There, the regulation at issue
prohibited displaying or carrying a firearm in common areas, but provided
an exception for the transport of a firearm to or from a resident’s unit.132
d. Frictional Restrictions
“Frictional” restrictions add time, cost, or difficulty to the process of
obtaining and keeping a firearm.133 This category commonly includes
mandatory waiting-periods,134 licensing and application schemes,135 and
fees for registration or licensing.136 In Kwong v. Bloomberg, for example,
130. See, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining
that although the Supreme Court did not provide reasoning for why certain longstanding
restrictions were permissible, “the natural explanation is that time, place and manner
restrictions may not significantly impair the right to possess a firearm for self-defense, and
may impose no appreciable burden on Second Amendment rights”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
838 (2013); Pineiro v. Gemme, 937 F. Supp. 2d 161, 174 (D. Mass. 2013) (analogizing a
Massachusetts state licensing decision that restricted an individual’s permit for sport and
hunting uses to a time, place, and manner restriction for permits for public gathering in the
First Amendment context). But see Teixeira v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. 12-cv-03288-WHO,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128435, at *25–26 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) (declining to apply First
Amendment concepts such as time, place, and manner jurisprudence in the context of a gun
store that “does not have the expressive characteristics that allow for this sort of contentbased analysis”).
131. See Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d 513, 535–37 (D. Del. 2012),
appeal docketed, No. 12-3433 (3d Cir. Aug. 27, 2012). This case is currently on appeal to
the Third Circuit. Before deciding the appeal, the Third Circuit certified a question to the
Delaware Supreme Court regarding the proper scope of the Delaware Constitution’s
protections of the right to keep and bear arms. See Order Requesting Certification of State
Law to Supreme Court, Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 12-3433 (3d Cir. July 18, 2013). Just
recently, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware Constitution offers broader
protections than the Second Amendment and that the restriction on possession in common
areas could not survive intermediate scrutiny. Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 403,
2014 Del. LEXIS 122, at *22–24, *29–33 (Mar. 18, 2014). The Delaware Supreme Court
explained that “the scope of the protections [the Delaware Constitution] provides are not
limited to the home” and that the restriction at issue “severely burdens the right by
functionally disallowing armed self-defense in areas that [r]esidents, their families, and
guests may occupy as part of their living space.” Id. at *22, *33.
132. See Wilmington Hous. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d at 519–20.
133. See Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1273.
134. See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, No. 1:11-CV-2137, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172946, at
*5–10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013) (denying the defendant California’s motion for summary
judgment, because a California law that imposed at least a ten-day waiting period between
purchase and delivery of a firearm would pass rational basis review but was not likely to
pass intermediate scrutiny).
135. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1), (3)(a) (McKinney 2014) (requiring an
applicant for a license to carry a pistol or revolver to demonstrate, among other things,
residency, citizenship, and good moral character). In addition, § 400.00(4) provides that an
applicant must undergo an investigation by the local police authorities of the accuracy of his
application. All of these requirements add time and cost to the process of applying for a
firearm license.
136. See, e.g., Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 161 (2d Cir. 2013).
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the Second Circuit upheld a New York City law, which required residents
to pay a $340 licensing fee for a three-year license to possess a handgun.137
Frictional restrictions may be analyzed similarly to time, place, and manner
restrictions, but they can be differentiated because they typically add time
or cost to possession regardless of location or manner of use.138
2. Categories of Justifications for Restrictions
This section will discuss four categories of justifications for restrictions.
Eugene Volokh argues that courts should separate challenged restrictions
into categories based on the government’s justification for such a
restriction, rather than applying one level of scrutiny indiscriminately.139
State and local governments’ justifications for firearms restrictions
generally fall into one or more of four categories: (1) the restricted conduct
is not within the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections; (2) the
restriction does not burden the right to keep and bear arms enough to rise to
the level of infringement; (3) even if the restriction imposes a significant
burden on the exercise of that right, it is justified by a significant reduction
in harm to the public; and (4) the government is acting in its proprietary
capacity as a landlord or employer, rather than as a sovereign, and its
authority is greater to regulate conduct.140 These categories are analytically
useful because it is inappropriate, for example, to apply the same level of
exacting scrutiny to a restriction that only slightly burdens the right as to a
restriction that severely burdens that right.141 In addition, these categories
help to analogize between restrictions across different cases.142

137. Id. New York sets a $3 to $10 range for such a fee elsewhere in the state, but allows
New York City and Nassau County to set their own fees outside of this range. N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 400.00(14). The Second Circuit upheld this provision against an Equal Protection
challenge as well. See Kwong, 723 F.3d at 169–72.
138. But see United States v. Gonzalez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127121, at *23 (D. Utah
Nov. 2, 2011) (describing a $200 tax on firearm registration as a time, place, and manner
restriction that did not impose a significant burden on the exercise of Second Amendment
rights).
139. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2009).
140. Id. at 1446–47.
141. See id. at 1447.
142. See id. A prohibition on possession by minors could be justified by a scope
argument, as constitutional rights have historically been limited when extended to minors. A
prohibition on possession by eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, however, would fall within the
scope of the right, but could be justified because restricting that population’s ownership
would reduce public harm. Thus, even though both of these prohibitions are age-based
restrictions on who can own firearms, their justifications are very different and it may not be
helpful to analogize between the two. If, however, the ban on possession by minors is also
justified by its reduction of public harm, then its argument would be more broadly
applicable. See id. at 1447, 1512.
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a. Scope
A restriction may be justified because it restricts behavior or individuals
that are not covered by the protected right as understood by “the
constitutional text, the original meaning, or our understanding of
background constitutional norms.”143 The scope of the Second Amendment
right is, of course, contested,144 but some arguments are easier to make than
others. “Who” restrictions, for example, are often justified because they
restrict individuals to whom the constitutional right is not commonly
thought to extend,145 or individuals who are seen to have forfeited the
right.146
b. Burden
According to Volokh, the majority opinion in Heller can be seen as
invalidating the District of Columbia’s ban because it was an impermissibly
harsh burden on the exercise of the core Second Amendment right.147
Because Americans overwhelmingly choose handguns as their weapon for
self-defense, a total ban on handguns is an unconstitutional burden on the
right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home, even if the
possession of other firearms remains legal.148
For example, the Second Circuit analyzed a challenge to a licensing fee
in terms of the burden it imposed on an individual’s exercise of the Second
Amendment right.149 Because the court found that the licensing fee did not
impose a substantial burden as applied to the plaintiffs, it applied
intermediate scrutiny to decide whether the burden imposed was
constitutional.150

143. Id. at 1449.
144. See supra Part I.A.
145. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1453 (discussing, for example, minors who have
limited constitutional rights to sexual autonomy, the right to marry, or the right to abortion).
146. See Golimowski, supra note 118, at 1615–16 (discussing how felons are subject to
forfeiture of certain constitutional rights, including even the right to vote); see also Volokh,
supra note 139, at 1452 (discussing prisoners, for example, who forfeit many constitutional
rights including many First and Fourth Amendment rights).
147. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1456–57.
148. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (“[B]anning from
the home the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s
home and family . . . fail[s] constitutional muster.” (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia,
478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007))).
149. See Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 167–69 (2d Cir. 2013).
150. See id. at 167–68 (“[H]eightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that
(like the complete prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a substantial
burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or
for other lawful purposes) . . . . [T]he fact that the licensing regime [in this case] makes the
exercise of one’s Second Amendment rights more expensive does not necessarily mean that
it ‘substantially burdens’ that right.” (quoting United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166
(2d Cir. 2012))).
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c. Danger Reduction
Even when the restriction at issue falls within the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protections, governments can justify a burden on the right to
keep and bear arms by showing that it is aimed at reducing some public
harm.151 In this category, courts often use traditional levels of scrutiny to
evaluate whether the restriction properly serves the goal of reducing some
danger to the public.152 In Osterweil v. Bartlett,153 for example, the court
applied intermediate scrutiny to a New York licensing scheme that excluded
nonresidents.154 In doing so, the court noted that New York state could
better ensure the public safety of its citizens “[b]y limiting handgun licenses
to those people who have the greatest contacts with New York.”155
d. Government As Proprietor
Some restrictions may be justified because the government is acting in a
different role, not as a sovereign but as a proprietor.156 Rather than using
its sovereign power to regulate private conduct, the government may act as
a landowner or an employer, for example.157 This distinction is more fully
developed in other contexts,158 but it may still prove useful in the context of
firearm regulations. Volokh points out that this distinction often makes
sense to “give the government more power when it comes to accomplishing
its democratically determined goals on its property and with its wage
payments, and to keep this power from bleeding over to controls of private
citizens’ behavior on private property.”159 Volokh goes on to argue,
however, that some government property, such as parks or public housing,
might not warrant increased deference to government-as-proprietor
restrictions.160

151. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1461 (“The real inquiry is into whether and when a
right may be substantially burdened in order to materially reduce the danger flowing from
the exercise of the right, and into what sort of proof must be given to show that the
substantial restriction will indeed reduce the danger.”).
152. See id. (“Courts sometimes . . . say[] that a constitutional right may be restricted
when the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling government interest, or is
substantially related to an important government interest.”).
153. 819 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).
154. See id. at 84–86.
155. See id. at 85 (“[T]he law allows the government to monitor its licensees more closely
and better ensure the public safety.”). But see Volokh, supra note 139, at 1514–15 (arguing
that the distinction between citizens and aliens is better understood as a scope justification,
since it stems from an interpretation of “the people” as including noncitizens).
156. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1473.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 1473–74 (discussing examples where the government can more
significantly regulate the private behavior of its employees, tenants, or people entering
government-owned land, especially in the First Amendment context).
159. See id. at 1474.
160. See id. at 1475.
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II. A ROCKY ROAD AFTER HELLER
This Part explores recent case law deciding challenges to firearm
restrictions. It describes several loose frameworks of analysis applied by
courts in the wake of Heller and McDonald and offers an overview of the
kinds of restrictions that have been upheld. It then summarizes several
competing and sometimes contradictory accounts of the post-Heller
regulatory landscape.
A. What Has Happened Since Heller in the Lower Courts?
This section provides an overview of the lower court cases that have
heard challenges to state and local gun regulations since McDonald made
Heller applicable to the states. Since Heller and McDonald, many courts
have struggled to apply the holding in Heller to firearms regulations that
might not rise to the level of the total ban seen in the District of Columbia
and in Chicago.161 Beyond the narrow scope of Heller’s holding, lower
courts and regulators encounter a terra incognita as to how far the Second
Amendment’s protections extend beyond the home and beyond the selfdefense context and as to what burdens will be upheld as constitutional
exercises of government power.162 In the past several years, there has been
a flood of literature concerning these questions.163 Some of the literature
and lower court decisions have incorporated aspects of First Amendment
jurisprudence into their analysis.164
161. See, e.g., Osterweil v. Bartlett, 819 F. Supp. 2d 72, 81–82 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The
Supreme Court . . . identified a non-exclusive, illustrative list of constitutionally permissible
restrictions on the Second Amendment, but declined to clarify the class of appropriate
restrictions other than ‘longstanding prohibitions’ on the right to keep and bear arms. This
uncertainty has led to a deluge of litigation concerning the intersection of the individual right
to keep and bear arms as defined by Heller and various firearms restrictions.”). But see Ezell
v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 700 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that although Heller did not
answer every question, courts are not “without a framework for how to proceed”).
162. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing the
“dilemma faced by lower courts in the post-Heller world: how far to push Heller beyond its
undisputed core holding” and concluding that “[t]he whole matter strikes us as a vast terra
incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree”).
163. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right To Carry Guns Outside the
Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225 (2008); Stephen G. Gilles & Nelson Lund, Mandatory
Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners: Design Choices and Second Amendment Limits, 14
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 18 (2013); Andrew R. Gould, Note, The
Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 1535 (2009); Michael J. Habib, Note, The Future of Gun Control Laws Post-McDonald
and Heller and the Death of One-Gun-Per-Month Legislation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1339
(2012).
164. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right to
free speech, an undeniably enumerated fundamental right, is susceptible to several standards
of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law challenged and the type of speech at issue. We
see no reason why the Second Amendment would be any different.” (citation omitted));
Justice v. Town of Cicero, 827 F. Supp. 2d 835, 842–43 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment fee jurisprudence in upholding a firearms registration
fee, because the fee was designed to defray costs), aff’d, 468 F. App’x 642 (7th Cir. 2012);
see also Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and
“Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
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1. Two-Pronged Approach or One-Pronged Approach?
Analyzing challenges to firearms restrictions, many lower courts have
adopted a two-pronged approach.165 First, a court will “ask whether the
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the
Second Amendment’s guarantee.”166 Second, if the law does impose a
burden within the scope of the right, the court will apply some level of
means-ends scrutiny.167
Most courts agree that the appropriate degree of scrutiny should depend
“on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the
challenged law burdens the right.”168 Restrictions that burden the core of
the Second Amendment right as described in Heller receive strict scrutiny,
while restrictions that do not impinge on the core but nonetheless burden
the right receive more lenient scrutiny.169 The first prong of the approach
looks most like an inquiry into whether the restriction falls within the scope
of the Second Amendment right.170 Although courts may use language that
suggests a burden inquiry,171 the first prong asks whether the restriction
“regulates conduct that falls within the scope of the Second
Amendment.”172 Courts have struggled with this first inquiry, as it requires
them to formulate some boundaries of the right deliberately left unclear in
Heller.173 Different courts have emphasized different approaches to
navigating this as yet uncharted territory.174
In formulating the two-pronged approach, the court in United States v.
Marzzarella read Heller’s list of restrictions to be “presumptively lawful”
because they fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment guarantee.175
In Marzzarella, the court upheld a federal prohibition on firearms with

165. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 197 (5th Cir. 2012) (adopting the two-step inquiry because it “comports with
the language of Heller”), cert. denied, No. 13-137, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 1558 (Feb. 24, 2014).
166. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
167. See id.
168. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010); accord Nat’l Rifle
Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195.
169. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 195.
170. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
171. See, e.g., Powell v. Tompkins, 926 F. Supp. 2d 367, 387 (D. Mass. 2013).
172. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
173. See, e.g., id. at 92 (“Heller did not purport to fully define all the contours of the
Second Amendment, and accordingly, much of the scope of the right remains unsettled.
While the Second Amendment clearly protects possession for certain lawful purposes, it is
not the case that all possession for these purposes is protected conduct.” (citation omitted)).
174. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 194 (“To determine whether a law impinges on the
Second Amendment right, we look to whether the law harmonizes with the historical
traditions associated with the Second Amendment guarantee.”). But see United States v.
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“The better
approach is to acknowledge the limits of the scope inquiry in a more straightforward way:
The historical evidence is inconclusive at best.”).
175. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (discussing an alternative reading of the Heller list
as suggesting that those restrictions were presumptively lawful because they would satisfy
some sort of means-ends scrutiny, but ultimately finding the scope reading a better one).
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obliterated serial numbers.176 Applying the first prong, the court inquired
as to whether the restriction regulated conduct protected by the Second
Amendment. In so doing, the court read Heller’s list of presumptively
lawful regulations “to leave intact additional classes of restrictions.”177 The
court reasoned that although Heller listed historical prohibitions, “it is not
clear that pre-ratification presence is the only avenue to a categorical
exception.”178 The court found unconvincing the argument that firearms
without serial numbers were a categorically protected type of weapon
because serial numbers were not contemplated during the Founding era.179
The court acknowledged, however, that although firearms without serial
numbers do not receive categorical protection, the restriction at issue might
still place a burden on the core of the Second Amendment right—the right
to self-defense in the home.180
The Marzzarella court was ultimately reluctant to decide whether the
restriction fell within the scope of the Second Amendment and found that
because it passed intermediate or strict scrutiny, it was nonetheless
constitutional.181 Analogizing to the First Amendment context, the court
explained that enumerated rights are subject to different levels of scrutiny
depending on the type of restriction and the type of conduct being
burdened.182 The court proceeded to apply intermediate scrutiny,183
concluding that the restriction at issue was far less restrictive than the
handgun ban struck down in Heller and only sought to regulate “the manner
in which persons may lawfully exercise their Second Amendment
rights.”184 Applying intermediate scrutiny to the prohibition on firearms
without original serial numbers, the court first found that the government’s
asserted interest in assisting law enforcement in tracking weapons used in
crimes to be a substantial or important interest.185 Next, the court found a
176. See id. at 101.
177. Id. at 92–93.
178. Id. at 93.
179. Id. at 93–94 (“It would make little sense to categorically protect a class of weapons
bearing a certain characteristic when, at the time of ratification, citizens had no concept of
that characteristic or how it fit within the right to bear arms.”).
180. Id. at 94.
181. See id. at 95.
182. See id. at 96–97 (“[T]he right to free speech, an undeniably enumerated fundamental
right, is susceptible to several standards of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law
challenged and the type of speech at issue. We see no reason why the Second Amendment
would be any different.” (citation omitted)).
183. The Marzzarella court described intermediate scrutiny as requiring that the asserted
governmental interest be “either significant, substantial, or important,” and “the fit between
the challenged regulation and the asserted objective be reasonable, not perfect.” Id. at 98
(internal quotation marks omitted). Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, requires an asserted
government interest that is “compelling” and a restriction that is “narrowly tailored” to
achieve that compelling interest. Id. at 99. “Narrow tailoring requires that the regulation
actually advance the compelling interest it is designed to serve. The law must be the leastrestrictive method of serving that interest, and the burdening of a significant amount of
protected conduct not implicating the interest is evidence the regulation is insufficiently
tailored.” Id. at 100 (citation omitted).
184. Id. at 97.
185. See id. at 98.
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close fit between the restriction and the asserted interest because the statute
only restricted possession of unmarked firearms.186
Other courts have similarly declined to answer the first prong’s question
of whether the burdened conduct falls within the scope of the Second
Amendment’s guarantee. In United States v. Decastro, the Second Circuit
bypassed this inquiry altogether and held that heightened scrutiny is only
appropriate for restrictions that substantially burden the exercise of the
Second Amendment right.187 Because Heller emphasized just how
burdensome the District of Columbia’s restrictions were throughout the
decision, the Second Circuit reasoned that it is the degree of burden that
should trigger the different levels of scrutiny.188 Under this rationale, the
Second Circuit held that Heller does not “mandate that any marginal,
incremental or even appreciable restraint on the right to keep and bear arms
be subject to heightened scrutiny.”189 Instead, only those restrictions that
place a substantial burden on that right should receive heightened
scrutiny.190 The Second Circuit in Decastro found general support for this
approach in several cases that applied the two-pronged approach more
formally.191
2. Which Restrictions Have Survived Judicial Scrutiny?
Many challenges to firearm restrictions have argued that the Heller
decision offers protections for “the sorts of weapons protected . . . ‘in
common use at the time.’”192 In deciding whether this phrase offers
categorical protection to some firearms, courts have taken several different
approaches. In United States v. Chester, for example, the Fourth Circuit
interpreted this phrase to support a broader proposition that the scope of the
Second Amendment was limited by its historical understandings.193 A
district court similarly read the common use passage to support the general
proposition that the Second Amendment does not protect possession in
186. See id. at 99. The court went on to explain that though it chose to apply intermediate
scrutiny, the restriction at issue would pass strict scrutiny as well. See id. The court found
that the government’s interest in tracing firearm serial numbers was compelling because it
helped law enforcement to prevent crime and collect “vital criminology statistics.” Id. at 99–
100. The court also found that the restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that end, as it
“restricts possession only of weapons which have been made less susceptible to tracing.” Id.
at 100–01.
187. See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 838 (2013).
188. See id. at 165–68.
189. Id. at 166.
190. See id.
191. See id. (citing Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
85, 94–95 (3d Cir. 2010)). But see Silvester v. Harris, No. 1:11-CV-2137, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 172946, at *6, *13–14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2013) (distinguishing the Second Circuit’s
“substantial burden test” from the two-pronged approach, which the Ninth Circuit and a
majority of other circuits had adopted).
192. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
193. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 676, 678–79 (4th Cir. 2010).
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certain places, by certain people, or of certain weapons.194 In Marzzarella,
the Third Circuit found unconvincing an argument that because firearms
without serial numbers were “of the kind in common use” in 1791, they
should be protected by the Second Amendment guarantee.195 The court did
point out, however, that any categorical protections that firearms might
enjoy under a concept of “common use” would be based on their functional
characteristics.196 Even where a court indicated that the weapons at issue
might be in common use, it upheld the restrictions because they would pass
intermediate scrutiny even if within the Second Amendment’s scope.197
Some courts have used the “common use” language to hold certain
unusual and dangerous weapons outside the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protections. The Eighth Circuit, for example, took a more
literal approach in holding that the Second Amendment did not protect
possession of a machine gun.198 There, the court reasoned that because
machine guns are not commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes, they fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment
guarantee.199
Lower courts have upheld state licensing schemes that tend to place a
certain amount of discretion in the hands of the local law enforcement and
judiciary. In New Jersey, for example, a person must generally have a
permit in order to carry a handgun in public.200 In order to acquire a
permit, a person must demonstrate to local law enforcement that he or she
(1) is not subject to any disqualifications such as mental illness or criminal

194. See Richardson v. United States, No. 3:08-1146, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25644, at
*6–7 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2009) (“Thus, the Heller Court made clear that the Second
Amendment right it recognized does not include possession of certain types of weapons,
possession of weapons in certain places, or possession of weapons by certain categories of
individuals, such as convicted felons.”).
195. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 624).
196. See id. at 94 (“[I]t also would make little sense to categorically protect a class of
weapons bearing a certain characteristic wholly unrelated to their utility.
Heller
distinguished handguns from other classes of firearms, such as long guns, by looking to their
functionality.”).
197. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“We think it clear enough in the record that semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding
more than ten rounds are indeed in ‘common use,’ . . . . Nevertheless . . . we cannot be
certain whether these weapons are commonly used or are useful specifically for self-defense
or hunting and therefore whether the prohibitions of certain semi-automatic rifles and
magazines holding more than ten rounds meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear
arms.”).
198. See United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008).
199. Id.; accord United States v. McCartney, 357 F. App’x 73, 76 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machine guns,
silencers, grenades, or directional mines because they are not in common use and are
dangerous and unusual); United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2009)
(holding that pipe bombs are not protected under the Second Amendment because they are
not in common use); United States v. Perkins, No. 4:08CR 3064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72892, at *9–10 (D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2008) (holding that silencers or suppressors were
similarly unprotected by the Second Amendment because they are not in common use by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes).
200. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(b) (West 2013).
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history, (2) is familiar with safe handling of firearms, and (3) can
demonstrate a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun in public.201
“Justifiable need” is defined as “the urgent necessity for self-protection, as
evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a
special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other
than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun.”202
In Drake v. Filko, the Third Circuit applied the two-pronged approach
from Marzzarella to uphold the “justifiable need” requirement of the
licensing scheme.203 The Drake court found that the justifiable need
requirement fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment, because it is
a “presumptively lawful” and “longstanding” restriction on firearm
possession.204 Building on Marzzarella’s analysis, the Drake court
reasoned first that New Jersey had required some sort of showing of need
for a handgun license beginning in 1924.205 On a more general level, the
court referred to Heller’s exceptions for longstanding regulations of
concealed carry throughout the country’s history.206
Though the court found it unnecessary to apply any level of means-ends
scrutiny, it concluded that even if the justifiable need requirement fell
within the scope of the Second Amendment, it would satisfy intermediate
scrutiny.207 In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, the Second Circuit
upheld a similar permitting scheme, where permits were issued only when
an applicant can demonstrate (among other things) “proper cause.”208
Lower courts have also consistently upheld age restrictions on the
possession of firearms. In Powell v. Tompkins, the court upheld a
Massachusetts state licensing scheme that made it a crime to carry a firearm
without a license and only issued licenses to persons over the age of twentyone.209 There, the court established that classification-based restrictions on
firearms possession have enjoyed a long history, even predating the
Founding era.210 The court found that age-based restrictions like the
Massachusetts one at issue fell within that history.211 Applying the twopronged approach, the court thus held that the prohibition on possession by
eighteen to twenty-one-year-olds imposed no burden within the scope of the
Second Amendment’s protections.212
201. Id. § 2C:58-4(c).
202. N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:54-2.4(d)(1) (2014).
203. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 2013).
204. Id.
205. See id. at 432.
206. See id. at 432–33.
207. See id. at 430.
208. See Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
209. Powell v. Tompkins, 926 F. Supp. 2d 367, 387–88 (D. Mass. 2013).
210. See id. at 387.
211. See id. (“The facts evinced from this quick jaunt through history establish that
certain access-limiting conditions were and may lawfully be imposed upon individuals
seeking to own and use firearms. Age-based restrictions, enacted for reasons of public
safety, are among those lawful impositions.”).
212. See id.
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The Fifth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in National Rifle Ass’n v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives.213 There, the court
found that a federal restriction on access to and purchase of certain firearms
by persons under the age of twenty-one most likely fell outside the scope of
the Second Amendment guarantee, but even if it did not, it should be upheld
under step two of the inquiry.214 Before proceeding to step two, however,
the court analyzed Founding-era attitudes, concluding that minors (under
the age of twenty-one) were understood to be excluded from the protections
of the right to keep and bear arms, so the public would have supported a
restriction on that population’s possession and access to firearms.215 The
court proceeded to analyze nineteenth-century court decisions, legislative
records, and commentators, again concluding that restricting access of
persons under the age of twenty-one comports with a “longstanding,
historical tradition.”216 According to the court, this longstanding tradition
suggests that its proscriptions regulate conduct outside of the scope of the
Second Amendment’s protections.217
B. Competing Accounts of the Post-Heller Landscape
This section explores competing accounts of post-Heller decisions.
Many see Heller as an opportunity for courts to better define the Second
Amendment right and the framework of scrutiny to apply to challenges.218
Other commentators, however, argue that Heller has actually opened the
door for lower courts to enter into the gun control debate, which had been
populated largely by academics and special interest groups. Now that lower
courts have a platform from which to analyze firearms regulations,
deference to state and local legislative bodies may actually increase.
1. Judicial Restraint, Intermediate Scrutiny, and Deference
Allen Rostron argues that Justice Stephen Breyer’s suggested approach in
his Heller dissent is actually a better description of how lower courts have
treated challenges to gun regulations since that decision.219 While courts
have had little trouble applying some parts of Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion, other instructions have proved more difficult, leaving lower courts
to proceed in a Breyer-like fashion. First, Rostron points out that lower
courts have consistently applied the majority’s instructions that the right to
213. 700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1364 (2014).
214. See id.
215. See id. at 202.
216. Id. at 203. The court explained that the restriction at issue was consistent with that
tradition both at a high level of generality, “targeting select groups’ ability to access and to
use arms for the sake of public safety,” and more specifically with a history of “age- and
safety-based restrictions.” Id.
217. See id.
218. See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 14, at 2043 (“Subsequent litigation offers an
opportunity . . . to educate lower courts about the choices they have and to offer the guidance
the Court declined to provide about crafting rules that implement the guarantee Heller
recognized.”).
219. See generally Rostron, supra note 7.
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keep and bear arms only protects those who use them for legitimate, lawful
purposes.220 Second, Rostron argues that lower courts have also had little
trouble applying the majority’s instructions that the Second Amendment
only protects those firearms in “common use” to restrictions on certain
types of firearms.221
Lower courts have run into more difficulty, however, in applying the
majority’s identification of several examples of “presumptively lawful
regulatory measures.”222 Rostron explains that immediately after Heller,
many challenges were brought to the federal ban on firearm possession for
felons and were upheld because that prohibition was included in Justice
Scalia’s “list” of presumptively lawful restrictions.223 In 2009, however, a
Tenth Circuit judge pointed out that prohibiting felons from possessing
firearms might originate in the twentieth century, and therefore not be so
clearly “longstanding.”224 After this discussion, lower courts began to
inquire more deeply into the historical tradition of felon-in-possession
restrictions and into the specific characteristics of the felon seeking to
possess a firearm.225 Rostron contends that because such historical
inquiries inevitably produce unclear results, “courts ultimately decide what
to do . . . based on assessments about sound public policy for modern-day
America.”226
Analyzing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Masciandaro,
for example, Rostron finds that the court discussed extensively the
presumptively lawful regulations discussed in Heller and how that decision
should apply to the restriction possessing firearms in cars on national park
property.227 Nonetheless, Rostron argues, the court ultimately upheld the
conviction because “the government had sound reasons for regulating guns
in ‘a national park area where large numbers of people, including children,
220. See id. Rostron discusses how courts have consistently upheld statutes “prohibiting
the use of firearms in furtherance of violent crimes or drug trafficking offenses” and
sentencing enhancements for crimes committed with guns. See id. at 726. These decisions
are based in large part, Rostron argues, on the Court’s instruction that “the Second
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes.” See id. at 711 (emphasis added) (quoting District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. See id. at 726–29. Justice Scalia discussed “another important limitation on the right
to keep and carry arms,” namely that the right only protects those firearms “in common use
at the time.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (citation omitted). Rostron argues that lower courts
have followed these instructions by upholding restrictions on machine guns and shortbarreled shotguns, for example, though the courts often give little discussion as to what
constitutes a firearm “in common use.” See Rostron, supra note 7, at 726–27.
222. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 n.26.
223. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 729. Although these decisions deal with a federal
statute, the shift in analysis and treatment that Rostron identifies exists in the context of
challenged state and municipal restrictions as well.
224. See id. (discussing United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047–48 (10th Cir.
2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring)).
225. See id. at 731–32.
226. Id. at 732. Rostron notes that each challenge to the felon-in-possession statute has
failed. See id. at 733.
227. See id. at 735–36 (discussing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir.
2011)).
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congregate for recreation.’”228 The approach in Masciandaro, Rostron
argues, is repeated across other jurisdictions and is indicative of the
approach of most courts after Heller.229
Lower courts find the Heller decision even more difficult to apply in
practice when faced with challenges to restrictions not explicitly mentioned
in Justice Scalia’s opinion.230 First, Rostron notes that many state courts
have decided to uphold any restriction not unequivocally invalidated by
Heller and McDonald.231 This admittedly narrow reading of Heller and
McDonald certainly makes evaluating gun restrictions short of the total
bans in the District of Columbia and Chicago much simpler.
According to Rostron, federal courts have been more reluctant to apply
Heller’s holding so narrowly.232 He sees an evolution in courts’ treatment
of challenges, beginning with the approach in United States v. Booker.233
There, the district court upheld the federal statute prohibiting domestic
violence misdemeanants from firearm possession, reasoning that it was
analogous to the “longstanding” restriction on felon possession mentioned
in Heller.234 If the justification for Heller’s list of presumptively valid
restrictions is that they are good public policy because of their reduction of
public harm,235 then the Booker court’s reasoning makes sense.236
If Heller suggests, however, that those “longstanding” restrictions are
justified because they are traditional limitations on the right to keep and
bear arms, then lower courts should be engaging in a historical analysis
rather than evaluating current public policy choices.237 Rostron argues that
even the lower court decisions that purport to engage in such a historical

228. Id. at 736 (quoting Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473).
229. See id.
230. See id. at 736–37 (“[T]he Supreme Court provided an intriguing stew of different
signals, rather than a single clear recipe, for lower courts taking on the work of
implementing the right to keep and bear arms.”).
231. See id. at 737–38; see also, e.g., People v. Williams, 962 N.E.2d 1148, 1152 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2011) (“[T]he rulings in both Heller and McDonald made clear that the only type of
firearms possession they were declaring to be protected under the second amendment was
the right to possess handguns in the home for self-defense purposes.”); State v. Knight, 241
P.3d 120, 133 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (“It is clear that the Court was drawing a narrow line
regarding the violations related solely to use of a handgun in the home for self-defense
purposes. [The] . . . argument, that Heller conferred on an individual the right to carry a
concealed firearm, is unpersuasive.”); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011) (“If
the Supreme Court . . . meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to
say so more plainly.”). Rostron points out that California, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, “with the exception of Kansas, . . . are deeply ‘blue’
(i.e., liberal) states that rank in the top ten on lists of states with the strictest gun laws and the
lowest rates of firearm ownership.” Rostron, supra note 7, at 738–39.
232. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 739.
233. 570 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Me. 2008), aff’d, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011); Rostron,
supra note 7, at 739–40.
234. See Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
235. See supra Part I.C.2.c.
236. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 740.
237. See id. at 741.

2014]

REGULATING THE MILITIA WELL

3513

analysis238 “ultimately . . . illustrat[e] how historical evidence is often
indeterminate.”239 In challenges to prohibitions on possession by felons
and certain misdemeanants, for example, Rostron points out that because
felonies in the Founding era “were typically punishable by death and
imprisonment for such offenses was rare” courts are reluctant to rely too
heavily on historical and originalist arguments to analyze contemporary
policy choices about felon possession of firearms.240 Courts confront
similarly inconclusive historical evidence when analyzing challenges to
other types of contemporary restrictions, and Rostron argues that in the end,
most courts apply some type of balancing approach that is similar to
intermediate scrutiny.241
Thus, Rostron argues, most courts have instead applied the more familiar
framework of tiers of scrutiny applied in other constitutional rights
contexts.242 Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook’s en banc decision in United
States v. Skoien exemplifies this approach, ultimately upholding the federal
statute banning possession by domestic violence misdemeanants.243 Lower
courts using this familiar framework, according to Rostron, share several
important features that ultimately grant more deference to the legislative
branches in their public policy determinations.
First, how judges evaluate the government’s empirical claims of the
effects of the firearms restrictions determines in large part how demanding
the intermediate scrutiny will be.244 According to Volokh, if courts were to
require “substantial scientific proof” for the government’s claims of danger
reduction, courts would be striking down gun control laws left and right.245
Such proof simply does not exist.246 Instead, Rostron argues that lower
courts have followed Chief Judge Easterbrook’s lead and only require a

238. See, e.g., United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009). Rostron describes
Rene E. as a “quintessential example” of a lower court that engaged in a “strictly historical
analysis” to find “a longstanding tradition supporting” a restriction on juvenile handgun
access, thus upholding the restriction. Rostron, supra note 7, at 741.
239. Rostron, supra note 7, at 743.
[T]he answers that one derives from this sort of historical inquiry depends
greatly on the level of generality of the questions asked. If history proves that the
Founding Fathers accepted the general idea of age restrictions on access to guns,
perhaps that is all that should really matter, and the Founders’ more specific beliefs
about an appropriate age limit should be ignored because times have changed since
the eighteenth century.
Id. at 742.
240. Id. at 750–51 (quoting United States v. Walker, 709 F. Supp. 2d 460, 466 (E.D. Va.
2010)). “In a time when a felony conviction was essentially a death sentence, the issue of
whether a felon should have the right to keep and bear arms was nonsensical.” Id. at 751.
241. See id. at 752.
242. See id. at 744.
243. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Rostron, supra note
7, at 744; see also supra notes 123–24, and accompanying text.
244. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 746 (citing Volokh, supra note 139, at 1467–70).
245. See Volokh, supra note 139, at 1467–68.
246. See id. at 1468; Rostron, supra note 7, at 747 (discussing how “[t]he research that
exists simply is not capable of proving . . . one way or the other” whether gun control laws
actually reduce harm and make citizens safer).
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“strong showing”247 that the challenged restriction reasonably furthers an
important government interest.248 Reducing gun violence and protecting
public safety are clearly important government interests,249 and Rostron
argues that lower courts find that restrictions further that interest based on
logical arguments and conclusions, even in the absence of overwhelming
empirical evidence.250
Second, many courts have required a showing of a substantial burden251
on the right to keep and bear arms before allowing a constitutional
challenge to proceed to the intermediate scrutiny inquiry.252 This
requirement, Rostron argues, acts as a gatekeeper to constitutional
challenges to firearms restrictions, effecting even more deference to
legislators.253 Thus, courts may theoretically require more than simply a
plausible logical rationale for the reduction in public harm, but end up
deferring to legislators by finding that the restriction does not rise to the
level of a substantial burden on the Second Amendment right.
Rostron acknowledges that there are several lower court decisions that
seem to point in the opposite direction. The Seventh Circuit, in Ezell v. City
of Chicago, suggested that the highly deferential approach used in Skoien
(and across the country) might not apply to restrictions that come closer to
substantially burdening the core of the Second Amendment right.254
Rostron argues, however, that this exception to the overall trend is
decidedly a narrow one255 and that the majority of lower courts have
eschewed the categorical and historical approach of Justice Scalia’s Heller
opinion in favor of the approach laid out in Justice Breyer’s dissent.256

247. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.
248. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 748.
249. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876–77 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997) (concluding that the
offered government interests of “protecting public safety and preventing crime . . . are
substantial”)).
250. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 748. But see Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“The theoretical and empirical evidence (which overall is inconclusive) is
consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote self-defense.
Illinois had to provide us with more than merely a rational basis for believing that its
uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety. It has failed to meet this
burden.”).
251. See supra Part II.C.2.b.
252. See Rostron, supra note 7, at 750 (“By requiring a threshold showing of a significant
burden on the exercise of the right to keep and bear arms, courts reduce the number of
constitutional claims that even reach the intermediate scrutiny stage where some showing of
the challenged law’s probable effects is required.”).
253. See id. (“The sorting achieved by the substantial burden framework thus sensibly
pushes more of the job of evaluating gun control laws away from judges and back to
legislators.”).
254. See id. at 754 (citing Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)).
255. See id. at 755 (“[I]t is remarkable to think that this . . . ruling that enables
Chicagoans to travel a slightly shorter distance to firing ranges, is the most dramatic advance
for gun rights made by the lower courts in the years since Heller.” (footnote omitted)).
256. See id. at 757 (“Struggling to work within the more categorical framework of
decisionmaking favored by Justice Scalia, the lower courts have essentially wound up
embracing the sort of interest balancing that Justice Breyer recommended and that Scalia

2014]

REGULATING THE MILITIA WELL

3515

Lower courts since Heller have taken that decision and protected a right to
keep and bear arms “that is broad but not particularly deep.”257
2. The “Common Use” Standard
Nicholas Johnson argues that Heller stands for the idea that the Second
Amendment protects “those firearms in ‘common use for lawful purposes
like self-defense.’”258 The “common use standard” refers to “functionally
common” firearms, that is, firearms that, regardless of their manufacturer,
share certain characteristics.259 While this standard is problematic in many
ways, Johnson maintains that it represents “the core test for determining the
scope of the individual right to arms . . . articulated in [Heller]” with respect
to device restrictions.260
Johnson first argues that some restrictions should clearly fail under the
common use standard and are thus vulnerable to constitutional
challenges.261 Restrictions that require firearms to have certain product
safety features, such as magazine safeties or integral trigger locks, are likely
to be struck down because guns without these features are “undeniably
common self-defense guns.”262 Similarly, a New Jersey statute that will
restrict the sale of handguns without “smart gun”263 technology once that
technology is commercially available should clearly fail under the common
use standard, as “[o]rdinary handguns are widely used, and explicitly
protected under Heller.”264
Some restrictions are more difficult to analyze under the common use
standard. Johnson maintains that because of the “politics, mythology and
vociferously denounced.”). Rostron is careful to point out, however, that this may not be a
deliberate move away from the majority’s holding, but merely a pragmatic shift when
confronted with “the reality that historical inquiries are extremely difficult and do not
produce determinate answers to the types of detailed questions that must be resolved
concerning the wide range of gun laws and regulations in effect . . . throughout the country.”
Id. at 756–57.
257. Id. at 762. Although the right to keep and bear arms is now certainly broad enough
to protect nonmilitia uses, lower courts applying some form of highly deferential
intermediate scrutiny have proceeded with the utmost restraint. Id.
258. See Johnson, Common Use, supra note 106, at 4 (quoting District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008)).
259. See id.
260. Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1263; see also Michael S. Obermeier,
Note, Scoping Out the Limits of “Arms” Under the Second Amendment, 60 KAN. L. REV.
681, 700–01 (2012) (criticizing Heller’s common use standard for “basing an important
constitutional right on the vicissitudes of popular opinion, rather than a consistent, objective
standard”).
261. See Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1264 (describing how the “common
use standard gives straightforward answers to a number of questions”).
262. Id. at 1265.
263. “Smart gun” technology is a generic category referring to safety features that, among
other things, prevent a gun from being unlocked unless by an identified user. See Michael S.
Rosenwald, ‘We Need the iPhone of Guns’: Will Smart Guns Transform the Gun Industry?,
WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/we-need-the-iphone-ofguns-will-smart-guns-transform-the-gun-industry/2014/02/17/6ebe76da-8f58-11e3-b22712a45d109e03_story.html.
264. Johnson, Administering, supra note 106, at 1264.
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symbolism” surrounding how firearms get categorized, the standard is more
susceptible to manipulation and distortion.265 Johnson argues that because
some of the characteristics and distinctions used to separate restricted from
nonrestricted firearms are “mainly political or symbolic,” it is much more
difficult for courts to meaningfully analyze how the common use standard
might apply to those restrictions.266 Johnson predicts that this difficulty
may manifest in pressure to uphold device restrictions that are less
defensible under Heller’s common use standard.267 The real question that
Heller poses, and that lower courts have yet to answer, is to what extent
courts will accept these “taxonomical” manipulations as distinct
categories.268
Johnson points out that the common use standard will not assist lower
courts in handling challenges to frictional restrictions.269 For these
restrictions, Johnson suggests that the Court’s regulatory takings analysis
may predict how lower courts will address challenges to frictional
restrictions that add time, cost, or difficulty to the exercise of the Second
Amendment right.270 Thus, restrictions that are so costly or timeconsuming as to nearly extinguish the right will be unconstitutional, while
restrictions that impose minor burdens will be upheld.271
III. EVALUATING POST-HELLER ACCOUNTS
This Part evaluates how the accounts that Rostron and Johnson offer
measure against recent case law of lower courts. It concludes that the
confusion among lower courts more closely resembles Rostron’s account of
judicial deference and interest balancing. Though Johnson provides a
logical and plausible route that lower courts may choose to follow in the
future, decisions thus far have yet to lend support for this approach.
First, Johnson is accurate in predicting that courts will sometimes
evaluate challenges to device restrictions using a common use approach.272
Courts have been most confident in applying the common use logic when

265. See id. at 1265–66.
266. See id. at 1266 (discussing how these political or symbolic distinctions “distort[] the
delineation of legitimate substantive categories and complicates extrapolations from the
common use standard”).
267. See id. at 1266–67 (discussing assault weapons as a category that “has undeniable
political and symbolic resonance” such that “states, municipalities, and perhaps even courts
will feel especially pressured to uphold those distinctions”). Johnson worries “that lower
courts will be tempted to diminish [Heller and McDonald] and the Supreme Court will
respond or not depending on its political makeup at the time.” Id. at 1268.
268. See id. at 1272 (“The open question is how far courts will credit the fine distinctions
that are necessary to maintain restrictions on particular categories of technology. How small
a difference in appearance, mechanics, or ballistics will sustain a separate regulated
category?”).
269. See id. at 1273.
270. See id. at 1273–74.
271. See id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992), and Pa.
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), for the Court’s regulatory takings
framework).
272. See supra notes 193–99 and accompanying text.
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confronted with weapons that are clearly dangerous and unusual, and so
have upheld those prohibitions that restrict firearms not in common use.273
Even when confronted with the kinds of “easy fits” characterized by
Johnson, however, courts have shied away from applying any sort of
common use logic. Instead, those courts decide to bypass the scope inquiry
and uphold the challenged restrictions under some form of means-ends
scrutiny without deciding whether the weapons at issue are protected under
the Second Amendment.274
Further, recent case law has not shown indications of the kind of
manipulation of classifications of firearms Johnson has warned against.275
For device restrictions that are not clearly constitutional under the simplest
common use analysis, courts do not go through the trouble of applying a
common use analysis. Instead, courts have chosen to bypass this scope
inquiry, assuming that the restrictions do proscribe protected conduct, and
then proceed under some level of means-ends scrutiny.276
This approach much more closely resembles Rostron’s argument that
courts will uphold restrictions on dangerous and unusual weapons using the
common use logic, while eschewing the same logic when confronted with
less clearly unusual or dangerous weapons.277 While Johnson argues that
the common use standard will provide gun rights proponents with the
opportunity to challenge certain “easy fits,” the case law cuts the other
way.278
In addition, courts use Heller’s passage referring to those weapons in
common use to support broader propositions about the scope of the Second
Amendment right.279 Courts have interpreted the passage to lend general
support for the existence of categorical exclusions to the Second
Amendment guarantee (i.e., for certain uncommon weapons).280 Courts
have also read the passage to support the idea that an inquiry into the scope
of the Second Amendment’s protections should be historical in nature.281
In this way, courts have simply read the common use passage to support the
broader, interest-balancing inquiries that Rostron describes.282
In the context of evaluating challenges to frictional restrictions, Johnson
may be more accurate in his predictions.283 The district court’s order
denying summary judgment to the government defendants in Silvester v.
Harris may be an indication that courts will analyze more severe frictional
restrictions like mandatory waiting periods differently. 284 In Silvester, the
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 267–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part I.C.1.c.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, because a
California law that imposed at least a ten-day waiting period between
purchase and delivery of a firearm would pass rational basis review but was
not likely to pass intermediate scrutiny.285 Though that court did not
explicitly utilize a takings framework as Johnson suggested,286 the court
was certainly taking a less deferential approach than Rostron would have
predicted by actually scrutinizing the fit between the mandatory waiting
period and the asserted government justifications.287
The majority of court decisions since Heller, however, demonstrate that
courts prefer to apply some sort of means-ends scrutiny rather than
engaging in either a common use inquiry or a deeply historical analysis.288
Within a framework of interest balancing and some form of means-ends
scrutiny that does not require narrow tailoring, state and municipal
regulators have enjoyed much greater deference than predicted by Johnson.
It is too soon to tell whether less deferential recent opinions such as
Silvester will survive appellate review.289 It is unlikely, however, that
against the great weight of case law decided in favor of upholding firearms
restrictions in the last five years, that decision will shift the trend away from
deference and judicial restraint.
CONCLUSION
While Heller certainly may be “historic in its implications”290 for
theoretical discussions of firearms regulations, lower courts have made
clear that the Second Amendment right is “broad but not particularly
deep.”291 Faced with confusing and contradictory signals from the
Supreme Court, lower courts have retreated to the familiar territory of
means-ends scrutiny. In doing so, courts have upheld the vast majority of
firearms regulations against challenges by gun rights proponents, so long as
those regulations do not rise to the level of a total ban as seen in the District
of Columbia and Chicago. While it remains to be seen whether regulators
will seize this trend as an opportunity to expand current restrictions up to
(but not crossing) the line of a total ban, it is clear that courts have signaled
their deference to state and local governments in this area.

285. Silvester v. Harris, No. 1:11-CV-2137, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172946 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 9, 2013).
286. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
288. See supra Part II.A.
289. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
290. Barnett, supra note 12.
291. Rostron, supra note 7, at 762.

